Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, No. 05-259 (June 22, 2006)
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from engaging in actions that a reasonable employee would find materially adverse, which includes conduct that would "dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin, as well as retaliation against those who avail themselves of this protection. The decision affirms that of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in favor of the employee, but on different grounds. Burlington Northern forklift operator Shelia White was reassigned to the more physically demanding job of repairing railroad track after she complained to management about sexual harassment by her immediate supervisor. Ms. White filed a retaliation complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). She was then suspended without pay for insubordination for 37 days, before winning a union grievance in which she was reinstated with back pay. Ms. White filed suit under Title VII, alleging that Burlington Northern's actions were retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment. A federal district court jury returned a verdict in her favor for $43,500 in compensatory damages, which was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Burlington Northern appealed to the Supreme Court. While the company agreed that both the district court and the Sixth Circuit had correctly defined Title VII retaliation as "a materially adverse change in the terms of employment," it argued that they had misapplied the standard and that Ms. White had suffered no significant change. Ms. White countered that her claim would succeed under any standard, but that the Sixth Circuit had set the bar too high for employees in retaliation cases. She contended that Title VII bars employers from taking any sort of retaliatory action regardless of its significance, including shifting the employee's job responsibilities.
In an opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Court rejected Burlington Northern's and the U.S. Solicitor General's argument that employees must demonstrate "a link between the challenged retaliatory action and the terms, conditions, or status of employment," the same test as required under Title VII's core anti-discrimination provision. Instead, the Court found that the anti-discrimination provision differs in important ways from the language in the anti-retaliation provision. While the anti-discrimination provision is limited to employer conduct that affects employees' "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," the anti-retaliation provision does not share these limitations. The purpose of the anti-retaliation provision is to protect employees from any type of employer action, whether at work or outside work, intended to dissuade the employee from asserting his or her right to be free from discrimination. The Court agreed with the Seventh and D.C. Circuits that a plaintiff in a Title VII retaliation action "must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, 'which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.'" Applying this standard to the facts, the Court concluded that the there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.
While Justice Alito concurred with the Court's unanimous judgment in favor of the employee, he contended that the standard adopted by the Court has no basis in the statutory language and will "lead to practical problems." His concurrence argued that, "[u]nder the majority's test…, employer conduct that causes harm to an employee is permitted so long as the employer conduct is not so severe as to dissuade a reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." He argued that the practical consequences of employing this standard will lead courts astray from Congress's intent when they drafted Title VII. In Justice Alito's view, the standard imposes an inversely proportional scale of severity, so that the more severe the discrimination, the more severe the retaliation must be to dissuade the employee, while an employee subject to milder discrimination will be more easily dissuaded from complaining because the benefits are less. He also contended that the majority's conception of a reasonable worker is unclear. Finally, he found the "majority's interpretation contains a loose and unfamiliar causation standard."
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, No. 05-259 (June 22, 2006)
[Link to full opinion][
Editor's Note: The Associated Press notes below that, "Charges of unlawful retaliation under Title VII nearly doubled between 1992 and 2005, from 10,499 to 19,429. They account for a quarter of the [EEOC's] caseload." Past coverage of the case is available on the NSBA School Law pages.]
Washington PostBy Toni Locy (Associated Press)
[Link to full story][NSBA School Law pages on Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White]