Houlihan v. Sussex Technical Sch. Dist., 2006 WL 3349534 (D. Del. Nov. 16, 2006)
A U.S. district court in Delaware has ruled that a former school psychologist who was terminated after complaining about the school’s noncompliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) stated a valid legal cause of action for retaliation under the federal Rehabilitation Act, but not under the First Amendment. Shortly after Dorothy Houlihan was assigned to the position of psychologist at Sussex Technical High School, she brought various incidents of noncompliance with IDEA to the attention of Vice Principal Steven Huber. As a result, she was asked to assume the position of special education coordinator in addition to her duties as psychologist. However, when Ms. Houlihan discovered that the positions conflicted with each other, she asked to be relieved of the new role. Resuming her sole duties as psychologist, she clashed with STHS administrators over her continuing to call instances of noncompliance to the attention of the Sussex Technical School District (STSD). She claims Principal Sandra Walls-Culotta rewrote her job description to prevent her speaking out and directly addressing incidents with noncompliant colleagues. She also contends that after she contacted a school board member, the principal subjected her to written reprimands and negative performance evaluations. Ms. Houlihan eventually was informed that her contract would not be renewed. She sued, alleging retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act and her First Amendment right to free speech.
Addressing the Rehabilitation Act claim, the court pointed out that a plaintiff must satisfy the same elements for retaliation claim under this act as under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Under any of these acts, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she was engaged in a protected activity; (2) the defendant(s) knew she was engaged in a protected activity; (3) an adverse employment action was taken after, or contemporaneous with, the protected activity; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Regarding the first element, the court found that Ms. Houlihan’s allegation that she was advocating on behalf of disabled students and their parents in an effort to correct instances of noncompliance with IDEA has long been recognized by courts as a protected activity for purposes of establishing a retaliation claim. Turning to the second element, the court found that the allegations demonstrated that the principal and a school board member were apprised of the alleged noncompliance with IDEA. The allegations of reprimands and negative evaluations shortly after Ms. Houlihan had contacted the school board member satisfied the third element. Finally, she satisfied the fourth element because the timing of adverse actions was "sufficiently suggestive to demonstrate a causal connection for purposes of withstanding dismissal" of the suit at this early point in the litigation.
Turning to the First Amendment retaliation claim, the court cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006), concluding that Ms. Houlihan’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment because, as a public employee, her statements regarding IDEA noncompliance were made pursuant to her "official duties" and not in the role of a private citizen. After reviewing her allegations, the district court determined that she spoke in connection with her duties as school psychologist and/or as special education coordinator.
Houlihan v. Sussex Technical Sch. Dist., 2006 WL 3349534 (D. Del. Nov. 16, 2006)
[Editor’s Note: The Legal Clips summary of Garcetti is below.]
[NSBA School Law pages on Garcetti v. Ceballos]