School Dist. of the City of Pontiac v. Spellings, No. 05-2708 (6th Cir. Jan. 7, 2008)

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (KY, MI, OH, TN) has ruled that a group of school districts from several states, the National Education Association (NEA), and ten NEA-affiliate education associations have stated a valid legal claim that they are not liable for the costs of complying with mandates under the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in excess of the federal funding provided. Because of the act’s “Unfunded Mandates Provision” (UMA), at 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (2005), the court held that states did not have the clear notice of their liabilities under NCLB that is required by the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The provision reads: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize an officer or employee of the Federal Government to mandate, direct, or control a State, local educational agency, or school's curriculum, program of instruction, or allocation of State or local resources, or mandate a State or any subdivision thereof to spend any funds or incur any costs not paid for under the Act." The ruling reverses a U.S. district court’s dismissal of the suit and remands the case to that court for further proceedings. The lower court accepted the federal government’s interpretation of § 7907(a) as merely prohibiting a federal officer and employee, not Congress, from imposing unfunded mandates.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit first found that the school districts had legal standing to bring suit because their need to spend state and local funds on NCLB compliance was an “injury in fact” that can be redressed by a favorable decision. The court then rejected the district court’s conclusion that § 7907(a) merely prevents “rogue officers” from imposing requirements not authorized by NCLB. First, even if Congress intended this meaning, the interpretation would not comply with the Spending Clause because it falls “short of being so evident that a State would clearly understand it to be the interpretation Congress intended.” Second, § 7907(a) is reasonably read merely to prohibit federal officers from “controlling school curriculum and allocation of local funds,” but may say “nothing about these officers mandating States to spend funds or incur costs for unauthorized obligations.” Third, if Congress truly were “concerned about this sort of ultra vires conduct by federal officers and employees, it could have said so expressly.”

Turning to ED’s argument that the final clause of § 7907(a) simply emphasizes that state participation is voluntary, the court found this interpretation unsupported by the provision’s plain language. Moreover, the court found the use of the exact language as appears in § 7907(a) in the Perkins Vocational Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2471 (1988)—which unlike NCLB specifies some exceptions for which states must pay out of their own funds—was inconsistent with ED’s interpretation. The court also rejected ED’s reliance on the definition of the word “mandate” in the Unfunded Mandate Act, which excludes costs entailed in complying with voluntary programs. The court noted that “(1) NCLB makes no reference to the UMA’s definition of ‘mandate,’ which excludes voluntary participation in federal programs, and (2) the label ‘mandate’ is often applied to obligations that states assume voluntarily in order to qualify for federal funds.” As for NCLB’s legislative history, the court found it at best unclear in regard to § 7907(a), “and to the extent it supports either party, it bolsters Plaintiffs’ interpretation.” Finally, the court noted that former ED Secretary Rod Paige’s interpretation of § 7907(a), that “if it’s not funded, it’s not required,” is at odds with the current secretary’s interpretation, a discrepancy the court found demonstrates that “NCLB does not provide clear notice that their interpretation (and, apparently, the former Secretary’s) is somehow misplaced.”

[Editor’s Note: The decision prompted a hard-hitting dissent also worth reading. A summary of the district court opinion in the case is below. The Sixth Circuit relied for its Spending Clause analysis in part on the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in a 2006 case, also summarized below, that Congress could have, but did not, specify that school districts must pay for experts used by plaintiff parents who prevail in a special education dispute. For more on the NCLB decision, the sixth anniversary of NCLB’s enactment, and the latest on the prospects for the act’s reauthorization, see the BoardBuzz blog postings. The Hartford Courant reports that Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal “lauded the ruling Monday and said he plans to ask the U.S. District Court to rule on the merits of a similar lawsuit the State of Connecticut filed.” In a ruling in that case summarized at the last link below, a U.S. district court dismissed three out of four counts, but Mr. Blumenthal says “he will ask the court to rule on the case's merits or allow it to go to the appeals court.”]
NSBA School Law pages on School Dist. of the City of Pontiac v. Spellings
NSBA School Law pages on Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy
BoardBuzz on court decision
BoardBuzz on NCLB at six years
Hartford Courant By staff and wire services
NSBA School Law pages on Connecticut v. Spellings

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