October 12, 2008
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Stanley v. Carrier Mills Stonefort Sch. Dist., 2006 WL 2710672 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2006)


An Illinois federal district court has ruled that a parent stated valid legal claims that a school violated her rights by holding event in which students were encouraged to dress in apparel of the opposite gender. Lora Stanley’s three children and six foster children attend school in the Carrier Mills-Stonefort School District (CMSSD). During a district-wide spirit week, each day has a theme, and students are encouraged to dress accordingly. One day’s theme was "Opposite Sex Day" during which students were encouraged, but not required, to dress in the apparel of the opposite gender. Ms. Stanley held her children out of school on the ground that the Bible prohibits the wearing of the opposite sex’s clothing. After she spoke with the news media about her objections, Ms. Stanley alleged, one of her children was denied the special education services he was due under his individualized education program, and CMSSD Superintendent Richard Morgan contacted the Illinois Department of Children and Family services (IDCFS) to report her as an "unfit" parent. She also claimed the superintendent’s mother, who is a substitute teacher, subjected another of her children to excessive detentions and intrusive questions about the child’s home environment. Ms. Stanley eventually relocated so the children could attend school in another district. She then sued CMSSD, alleging several state and federal claims. The federal claims included violation of her due process right to raise and educate her children in accordance with her religious beliefs, infringement of her First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, retaliation for exercising her First Amendment right to free speech, and sexual harassment under Title IX.

The court addressed the due process and free exercise claims together, finding that CMSDD failed the two-pronged test for whether the school’s sponsorship of "Opposite Sex Day" infringed on Ms. Stanley’s due process right to raise and educate her children in accordance with her religious beliefs. First, "Opposite Sex Day" substantially burdened Ms. Stanley’s free exercise of religion, since it had a "coercive effect" that operated against her practice of religion. The court rejected CMSSD’s attempt to cite Sherman v. Community Consolidated School District 21 of Wheeling Township, 980 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1992), a decision that upheld voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in school, for the proposition that peer pressure can never constitute actionable coercion. Instead, the court read Sherman as implying that peer pressure might be sufficient under certain circumstances. While the court agreed that cross-dressing is hardly a religious activity or a burden on religious activity, it found the Bible contains a clear proscription against cross-dressing. Ms. Stanley had presented creditable allegations to support her claim, based on the facts that the event bore the school’s imprimatur and that her children would "bear the stigma … of being singled out" by their nonparticipation. Second, this burden on Ms. Sherman was not outweighed by the government’s interest in the challenged activity. In the absence of more facts or convincing arguments from CMSSD, Ms. Stanley had demonstrated that the burden of the "Opposite Sex Day" activity was onerous, while its benefit was slight to nonexistent.

The court rejected CMSSD’s argument that the retaliation claim based on the superintendent’s statements to IDCFS could not be brought because the statements were not slander per se. Statements need not be slander per se to constitute retaliation, and, in fact, need not be slanderous at all, the court found. A parent need only demonstrate that action taken against her would likely have chilled a person of reasonable firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity. The court also rejected CMSSD’s contention that Ms. Stanley could not base her retaliation claim on the alleged withholding of special education services because the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) required her first to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking a judicial remedy. Ms. Stanley was not proceeding under IDEA, but rather the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.

Finally, the court refused to dismiss the Title IX sexual harassment claim. It found that Ms. Stanley’s claim that "Opposite Sex Day" created a hostile learning environment was creditable because there were allegations that sexually suggestive activities occurred within the student body during the day. The court could not find that Ms. Stanley’s allegation that school publications contained jokes of sexual nature was insufficient to state a valid hostile environment claim.

Stanley v. Carrier Mills Stonefort Sch. Dist., 2006 WL 2710672 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2006)