Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., No. 06-116 (July 10, 2007)
A federal district court in Pennsylvania has ruled that school officials violated a high school student’s free speech rights when they disciplined him for his off-campus parody MySpace profile of the school’s principal. However, the court rejected the student’s challenge that the school district policies were vague and overbroad and found his parents’ constitutional claims without merit. As word of the MySpace profile spread through the school, students began accessing it on school computers. When school officials discovered that Justin Layshock was responsible for the profile, they placed him in an alternative education program. He sued. Addressing Justin’s free speech claim, the court found that the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Morse v. Frederick, 2007 WL 1804317 (U.S. June 25, 2007), was not controlling in this case because the "Justices unanimously agreed that Morse involved school-related speech" rather than off-campus speech. The district court concluded that the weight of student speech case law favored the view "that school officials' authority over off-campus expression is much more limited than expression on school grounds." The court also concluded that the relevant court precedents analyzed student speech, whether on or off campus, in accordance with the principles set forth in the Supreme Court’s ruling in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). The court identified the key issue as whether school officials had the authority to discipline the student for creating the profile on a computer off-campus.
In cases involving off-campus speech, the court found, the school must demonstrate an appropriate nexus between the speech and the school, and that on this "threshold ‘jurisdictional’ question [courts] will not defer to the conclusions of school administrators." Turning to the school district’s argument that its discipline was justified under the tests established either in Tinker or in Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), the court found that even assuming that the profile was the type of lewd, profane, and sexually inappropriate expression governed by Fraser, it could not be regulated on that basis because Fraser "does not expand the authority of schools to punish lewd and profane off-campus speech." Regarding the Tinker disruption test, the court concluded the school district had failed to establish a sufficient nexus, noting several gaps in the link between the student’s conduct and any material and substantial disruption to the school operations. In particular, the court noted that three other profiles of the principal were posted and available online at MySpace. The evidence also was unclear as to whether the "buzz" on campus resulted from the profile or the reaction of school officials. In addition, "[t]he actual disruption was rather minimal," i.e., no classes were cancelled, and no widespread disorder, violence, or student disciplinary action occurred. The court also rejected the contention that the "substantial disruption" standard was met out of any "fear of future disturbances," because the school was shut down for the holidays and the student was suspended immediately upon resumption of classes.
While it acknowledged the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling in J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002) that school officials had the authority to discipline a student for an off-campus website containing derogatory and threatening comments, the federal court reached "a slightly different balance between student expression and school authority." Nor did the federal court accept the school district’s arguments that the student’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment because it constituted "fighting words" and was "obscene." The school district’s reliance on the fighting words doctrine was misplaced, the court found, because "there is simply no in-person confrontation in cyberspace such that physical violence is likely to be instigated." As for obscenity, "While the profile is certainly juvenile and lacks serious value, it does not appeal to a prurient interest or portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way so as to rise to the level of obscenity as defined [by the U.S. Supreme Court] in Miller v. Calif., 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)."
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., No. 06-116 (July 10, 2007)
[Full opinion]
[Editor’s Note: In January 2006 the court had denied the student’s motion for a preliminary injunction barring the school district from disciplining him for the MySpace profile. At that time, the court found that the student had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on his free speech claim and that the school district had presented ample evidence that his off-campus conduct resulted in an actual disruption of the high school's day-to-day operations. For a summary of this previous ruling, see below.]
[NSBA School Law pages on Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist.]